Strategic Assessment of Functional Cooperation & Regional Security on Taiwan
BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND RESTRAINT
Philippine Policy Space on Taiwan: A more secure Philippines in a more uncertain region.
Author:Marilen J. Dañguilan, MD|Foreign Policy & Strategic Studies
Between Recognition and Restraint — 1975 Joint Communiqué & Functional Space
BETWEEN
RECOGNITION
AND
RESTRAINT
Philippine Policy Space on Taiwan
A more secure Philippines in a more uncertain region.
Geographic Proximity
Batanes (Philippines) <— ≈ 140 km from Mavulis —> Southern Taiwan
PEOPLE | SOVEREIGNTY | MARITIME SECURITY | A MORE SECURE TOMORROW
Status: Closed / Folded Shut
Viewing: Outside Face (Cover & Geo)
P1: Front Cover • P2: 1975 Starting Point • P3: Contingency
Compare interactive layout with the authenticated flyer publication.
Batanes to Taiwan: Distance, Radar & Sea Routes
Mavulis, the Philippines’ northernmost island, lies only ~140 km from southern Taiwan across the Bashi Channel. Tap the range rings and routes to inspect each corridor.
Batanes — Luzon Strait — Taiwan
Radar range & sea-route projection from Mavulis, the Philippines’ northernmost island.
Key Principles of the Policy Brief
1. Two Boundaries, A Policy Space
The 1975 Joint Communiqué sets the baseline commitment. Philippine interpretation and practice (executive orders, issuances, arrangements) set the operational boundary.
2. Taiwan Contingency & Citizen Protection
Any disruption directly touches Philippine national security, including ≈250,000 Filipino workers and residents, maritime sea lanes through the Luzon Strait, and submarine communication cables.
3. Functional Cooperation ≠ Recognition
Proven models include the 2015 MECO-TECO Fisheries Agreement, trade facilitation, and maritime humanitarian search and rescue.
Complete Policy Brief
By Marilen J. Dañguilan, MD
Executive Summary
This policy brief asks: What functional cooperation with Taiwan can the Philippines pursue in support of its maritime security and national interests while remaining within its commitments under the 1975 Joint Communiqué?
The 1975 Joint Communiqué that established diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and stated that the Philippines “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s position that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory.
The brief distinguishes what the Communiqué said from how the Philippines implemented it through executive orders, memoranda, and other issuances. The operational boundary created by subsequent Philippine policy and practice has moved inward or outward without changing diplomatic recognition. The resulting space between the two boundaries is available Philippine policy space.
I. Central Question
What functional cooperation with Taiwan can the Philippines pursue in support of its maritime security and national interests while remaining within its commitments under the 1975 Joint Communiqué? This brief begins with a simple distinction: what Beijing says the Philippines cannot do is one thing; what the Philippines has decided it cannot do is another. China’s objection matters; it is an input into Philippine decision-making, but it does not define Philippine policy nor set its boundary.
II. A Taiwan Contingency is a Philippine Security Concern
The geography is immediate: Mavulis, the Philippines’ northernmost island, lies only about 140–150 km from southern Taiwan, across the Bashi Channel. The Luzon Strait, about 250–300 km wide, is between Taiwan and mainland Luzon and connects the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. A blockade, hostile takeover or armed conflict could require the protection or evacuation of approximately 250,000 Filipinos in Taiwan, interrupt aviation and shipping, and damage critical submarine cables.
III. The 1975 Joint Communiqué
The Philippines did not say that it recognized Taiwan. It said that it “fully understands and respects” the Chinese government’s position. “Understands and respects” are not the same verbs as “recognizes”, “endorses”, “accepts”, or “agrees with.” The provision was embedded in reciprocal principles of sovereignty and non-aggression.
IV. Principle vs. Policy
The PRC’s One-China Principle and the Philippines’ One-China Policy are not interchangeable. Beijing’s principle does not determine the operational limits of Philippine policy; those limits exist in what Manila committed to and how successive administrations implement that baseline.